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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
WALKER REALTY and 
CALVIN FLORENCE, 
Plaintiffs and 
Appellants, 
vs. 
JOHN E. RUNYAN, ESQ., 
AIR FREIGHT, INC., 
E. DEAN SHELLEDY, 
MT. OLYMPUS ASSOCIATES, 
SHELTER, INC., and 
BETTILYON REALTY, INC., 
Defendants and 
Respondents. 
Case No. 14121 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action brought to recover a broker's 
commission allegedly owing to the Plaintiffs-Appellants 
from the Defendants-Respondents. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Defendants' motion for summary judgment was heard 
by the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Jr. Upon hearing argument 
of counsel and examining the pleadings on file, the court 
granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment as to Counts 
I ahd II of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint. Counsel for 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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the parties stipulated before the court that summary judgment 
as to Counts III and IV of Plaintiffs1 Second Amended Complaint 
should be granted against Plaintiffs. i ,..,
 v,tJ r..... ., .. .,,, 
f^riSMG*.!'* KIVJA'* 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
'• ns.i% m 
Defendants-Respondents seek affirmance of the 
i ' i l <-»! « OM SjflSr { ^jiy 
judgment of the trial court. 
( ».Q33 »HAYHU« .3 «fior. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS .YfJ3J,;l?H3 UAMa . H • 
On or before March 18, 1974, Plaintiffs-Appellants 
(hereinafter referred to as "Appellants") and Defendants-
Respondents (hereinafter referred to as "Respondents") entered 
into an oral brokerage agreement for the sale of real estate, 
P/rpi^ fTliriqp.^ q ^in V**TQ:& 
which agreement was subsequently confirmed by a letter from 
John E. Runyan dated March 18, 1974 (R.41). The agreement 
specifically provided that the broker's commission was contin-
gent upon the ultimate completion and delivery of the building 
as provided for in the written agreement between Respondents 
dated March 18, 1974 (R.44). The uncontroverted affidavits of 
Respondents established that the building was not delivered 
as provided and Appellants were, therefore, not entitled to 
the contingent broker's commission (R.50, 55-6). JciaionoP srii ™d 
H Subsequent to that date, the parties discussed another 
agreement for the sale of the building in question. John E.
 T D 
Runyan sent E. Dean Shelledy an offer by letter dated October 18, 
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
- 3 -
1974 (R.42-3), providing that Appellants were to receive a brokerfs 
commission should the contract be accepted by Shelledy. The 
uncontroverted affidavits of Respondents established that this 
offer was never accepted by Shelledy and Appellants were, there-
fore# not entitled to any brokerfs commission (R.50-1). 
Appellants then brought this action to recover 
a broker's commission on the proposed transactions, based 
upon the letters and proposed contract cited hereinabove 
and upon an alleged oral brokerage agreement (R.32, $2). 
• ARGUMENT 
Point I 
THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT WAS PROPER 
FOR THE REASON THAT THERE WERE NO DISPUTED 
ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT. 
It is evident from the record before the trial 
court that there were no disputed issues of material fact 
before that court. Appellants have completely misinterpreted 
the meaning and significance of John E. Runyan's letter of 
October 18, 1974 (R.42-3). The letter on its face is simply 
an offer — an offer to modify the previously abandoned 
agreement. The third paragraph of the letter makes this clear, 
referring to several conditions upon which Shelledy1s "accep-
tance is contingent11. It is further significant that the 
offer contains space for an acceptance by Shelledy, which 
space is vacant. The offer was not accepted, as shown by the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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lack of Shelledy's signature on the agreement, and by the 
uncontroverted affidavit of John E. Runyan (R.50-1) which 
states that the letter of October 18, 1974, was simply an 
offer that was never accepted. 
There is no disputed issue of material fact in 
this case. The agreement stated in the letter of March 18, 
1974 (R.44), is clearly contingent, and the contingency failed 
to materialize. The letter of October 18, 1974, is nothing 
more than an offer that was never accepted. There is no 
conflict between the two documents. The uncontroverted affi-
davits of the Respondents make that clear — protestations of 
the Appellants in their Brief notwithstanding. 
Point II 
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS DOES NOT DISTINGUISH 
BETWEEN "BROKERAGE" CONTRACTS AND "FINDER'S 
FEE" CONTRACTS, AND THIS CASE FALLS SQUARELY 
WITHIN ITS PROVISIONS. 
Notwithstanding the claims made by Appellants 
at Point II of their Brief, the Utah Statute of Frauds does 
not differentiate between finder's fee and brokerage agreements. 
The case cited by Appellants of Palmer v. Wahler, 133 Cal.App.2d 
705, 285 P.2d 8 (1955), does not support Appellants1 claim. 
In that case the court determined that the conflict in question 
dealt with chattels and not with "real estate" within the 
meaning of the Statute of Frauds (Id. 12-13). Therefore, 
any language relating to finder's fees and sales of real estate 
is rendered mere obiter dictum. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Additionally, the case is easily distinguished. 
First, the Utah Statute of Frauds at §25-5-4, U.C.A., is sub-
stantially different from the California Statute of Frauds 
found at Peering's California Codes, §1624, which is phrased 
differently and includes leases and short-term sales which 
the Utah statute does not. Secondly, Appellants have mis-
interpreted the holding of the Palmer case, supraP The court 
in Palmer interpreted the law to read that an oral brokerage 
agreement for the sale of real estate was valid, in spite of 
the Statute of Frauds, if the finder was not a licensed agent 
or broker. The plaintiff in Palmer recovered his fee only 
because he was not a licensed broker. In other words, the 
"exception" alluded to by Appellants was not a finder's fee 
exception, but rather a non-broker fee exception. 
The present case is clearly and easily distinguished 
from Palmer for the simple reason that Appellants in the present 
case admittedly are licensed real estate brokers (R.32) and, 
thereby, do not meet the requirement of the non-broker fee 
exception. This interpretation of Palmer is borne out by a 
reading of the subsequent decision of Porter v. Eirod, Inc., 
51 Cal. 784 (1966), 
Commentators have accepted the Palmer 
case as establishing that a finder's 
agreement with an unlicensed finder 
is not within the contemplation of 
the Statute of Frauds. Id. 787. 
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The situation created by the Palmer case and the 
judicial precedent it set were unique to California during 
the period from 1955 to 1967, and the situation has been des-
cribed in at least one recorded instance as an "anomaly" 
(Hasekian v. Krotz, 74 Cal. 410, 413 (1969)). Not only does 
the Palmer case deal with a unique interpretation of a unique 
situation, but the decision is totally irrelevant to the present 
case since Appellants are both licensed brokers. Not only this, 
but the California Legislature was evidently so shocked by 
the Palmer decision that it completely erased its inequitable 
consequences in 1967 by amending the statute in question* As 
stated in Krotz, supra, 413 n. 4: 
In 1967, the Legislature put an end to 
this anomaly by further amending Civil 
Code Section 1624, subdivision 5, by 
adding the words "or any other person", 
with the result that now a finder's 
agreement by whomsoever made must be 
r
 in writing. (Emphasis added.) 
y Palmer was a unique decision based on a grossly 
inequitable interpretation of statute, and the California 
Legislature effectively removed it from the annals of judicial 
precedent. It now stands as no more than a lifeless relic, 
and Appellants have unfortunately dredged it up and misinter-
preted its vitiated rule of law. The case is dead; and even 
if it were alive, it would be irrelevant since the Appellants 
are licensed brokers. 
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POINT III 
THE ALLEGED BROKERAGE CONTRACT HAS.,NOT BEEN 
FULLY PERFORMED, AND APPLICATION OF THE 
STATUTE OF FRAUDS DOES NOT THEREFORE PER-
PETRATE A FRAUD OR GROSS INEQUITY. 
Appellants claim at Point III of their Brief that 
on the basis of the Utah decision of Welchman v. Wood, 9 Ut.25 25, 
337 P.2d 410 (1959), it would be a fraud or a gross inequity to 
invoke the Statute of Frauds. Such reliance on the Welchman case 
is not soundly based. In Welchman, supra, the court dealt with 
a situation where the broker had been paid his commission and 
the brokerage contract was fully performed. A more exact look 
at the language quoted by Appellants at Page 4 of their Brief 
substantiates this. 
. . .the plaintiffs have fully performed 
by paying the commission, which full per-
formance would eliminate any application 
of the statute of frauds, becauses (sic) 
it may not be invoked to perpetrate a fraud 
or gross inequity. Id. 411. 
The statement in the Welchman case that the Statute of 
Frauds may not be invoked "to perpetrate a fraud or gross inequity" 
is clearly in reference to the rule that where a realty owner has 
fully executed and ratified an oral brokerage contract by paying 
the broker his full commission, it would be grossly inequitable 
to then allow that same property owner to deny the contract* The 
rule is sound, but in the present case it is irrelevant. 
Appellants mistakenly argue that "the lower court was 
in error if it granted summary judgment on that basis /Statute of 
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Frauds/ because plaintiff has fully performed. . • ." (Appel-
lants1 Brief, 4). This is not the way the rule works. To so 
interpret the Welchman rule is to render the Statute of Frauds 
inoperative, since in every case where a broker petitions the 
court for a commission he has "fully performed" his part of 
the transaction. The "full performance" rule enunciated in 
Welchman applies only where the entire contract has been fully 
performed and the commission has been paid. 
In the present case we clearly do not have a situation 
where the broker's commission has been paid (R.34, $10), and 
the Welchman rule is inapplicable. A cursory examination of 
the other cases cited by Appellants (Ravarino v. Price, 123 Ut. 
559# 260 P.2d 570 (1955); and Chadwick v. Arnold, 34 Ut. 48, 
95 P. 527 (1909)) discloses that those decisions are completely 
irrelevant to the facts before this court as neither case 
deals with oral brokerage agreements. Here, again, the exception 
to the Statute of Frauds cited by Appellants is inapplicable 
to the uncontroverted facts of the present case. 
Point IV 
THE RECORD LACKS SUFFICIENT MEMORANDA TO TAKE 
;
 THE ALLEGED BROKERAGE TRANSACTION OUTSIDE THE 
PURVIEW OF THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 
The documents cited by the Appellants as "sufficient 
memoranda" of the alleged oral brokerage agreement are not suffi-
cient by any standards. The letter of March 18, 1974, clearly 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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sets forth that payment of any fee is contingent upon certain 
conditions. These conditions were not met, and the letter of 
October 18, 1974, is not a memorandum of a contract but is 
merely an offer to contract which was not accepted according 
to the uncontroverted affidavits of John E. Runyan and E. Dean 
Shelledy. The affidavits themselves are clearly not sufficient 
memoranda. If anything, they stand in support of Respondents1 
position that the alleged contract terms were not met in the 
first instance (March 18, 1974) and not accepted in the second 
instance (October 18, 1974). 
The problem Appellants are faced with can be ascer-
tained by a reading of one of their cited cases, Fritsch v. Hess, 
49 Ut. 75, 162 P. 70 (1916). 
. . .almost any kind of writing will be 
sufficient if it be signed by the party 
sought to be charged and contains the 
essential terms of the contract. Id. 71. 
(Emphasis added.) 
The contract terms essential to the recovery of a 
broker's commission by the Appelants are simply not present 
in any writings signed by Respondents. 
Point V 
APPELLANTS MAY NOT REST UPON THE BARE ALLE-
GATIONS OF THEIR SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT WHEN 
FACED WITH A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AND 
THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT AND 
PROPER. 
Appellants have mistakenly presumed at Point V of their 
Brief that "defendant's motion for summary judgment was tantamount 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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to a motion to dismiss11 (Appellants1 Brief, 6). The claims 
made by Appellants notwithstanding, Rule 56(e) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure is not satisfied solely by Appellants1 
Second Amended Complaint and the Affidavit of Calvin Florence* 
primarily because Florence's affidavit does not dispute any 
issues of material fact. It simply states that Florence received 
certain letters from John E. Runyan, copies of which were attached 
to the affidavit. This is clearly insufficient. Rule 56(e) states, 
in pertinent part, as follows: 
When a motion for summary judgment is made 
and supported.as provided by this rule, an 
adverse party may not rest upon the mere 
allegations or denials of his pleading, 
but his response. . .must set forth specific 
facts showing that there is a genuine issue 
for trial. If he does not so respond, 
summary judgment, if appropriate, shall 
be entered against him. (1974 supp.) 
Appellants did not present to the trial court any 
evidence or testimony in any form whatsoever disputing the affi-
davits filed by Respondents0 This being the case, Appellants 
failed to show any issue of material fact, and the trial court 
had no choice but to grant summary judgment to the Defendants. 
Appellants apparently (and wrongfully) place reliance on an 
irrelevant Kansas case as the basis of their claim. At Page 6 
of their Brief, they state, 
. . .Defendant's motion for summary judg-
ment. . .could have been sustained only if 
the allegations of the petition clearly 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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demonstrated that the plaintiff did not 
have a claim for relief. . . . Continental 
Insurance Company v. Windle, 520 P^2d 1235 
(Kan. 1974). 
The case cited by Appellants makes no such holding. 
Windle dealt with a situation where there were no affidavits or 
memoranda on file, no sworn testimony, and no evidence. 
The record before us consists only of plain-
tiff's petition and defendant's motion for 
summary judgment; thus, our review is limited 
to consideration of the allegations of the 
petition. Id. 1237. 
In the present case, the trial court's decision was based 
on consideration of the Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint; 
the letter of March 18, 1974; the letter of October 18, 1974; 
the Affidavit of Calvin Florence (R.70); the Agreement dated 
March 18, 1974; the Affidavit of E. Dean Shelledy; the Affidavit 
of John E. Runyan; the Stipulation to Judgment in Civil Case No. 
220511 (R.53); and the memoranda filed by counsel(R. 21, 57). 
The court was entitled to consider all the testimony and exhibits 
before it, and if Appellants failed to submit sufficient evidence 
under Rule 56 (e) to warrant a trial on the matter, it is not 
the fault of Respondents. The material facts presented to the 
trial court by Respondents were uncontroverted by the Appellants 
and the court rightfully determined that Appellants could not 
recover as a matter of law. 
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« Point VI 
THE SCOPE OF APPELLATE REVIEW HEREIN APPLICABLE 
HAS BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY RESTRICTED BY THE PLAINTIFFS-
APPELLANTS DUE TO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF 
THE CASE. 
The scope of appellate review in the present case is 
significantly restricted by the stipulation entered into by 
the Appellants in the lower court proceedings. It was there 
stipulated at the time of hearing Defendants1 motion that said 
motion should be granted as to Counts III and IV of the Second 
Amended Complaint (R.83). Since the order of the court concerning 
Counts III and IV was based upon stipulation by the Appellants, 
they are thereby precluded from appealing the decision as it 
relates to those two counts. 5 Am.Jur.2d, Appeal and Error, 
§711 (1962). 
The scope of appellate review is further restricted by 
an important legal presumption — one which Appellants have 
failed to rebut. 
The scope of appellate review is largely 
influenced by a number of rebuttable pre-
sumptions, pre-eminent among which is that 
which, at least where the decision has been 
rendered by a court of record or a court 
of general jurisdiction, assumes the correct-
ness of the decision or ruling appealed from 
and the regularity of the proceedings below. 
Thus, every reasonable intendment favorable 
to a ruling of the court below will be indulged, 
and in the absence of an affirmative showing 
to the contrary, a ruling of the court below 
will be presumed to have been properly made 
and for sound reasons. 5 Am.Jur02d, Appeal 
and Error, §704 (1962). (Emphasis added.) 
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The burden of proof is upon the Appellants and they 
have failed to carry that burden. _ 
Finally, the scope of appellate review is also restricted 
by Appellants' own Brief. Respondents have fully answered the 
issues presented by the Appellants and are not on notice as to 
any other issues before the court. In Mead v. Mead, 301 P.2d 
691 (Okla 1956), the rule was stated as follows: 
It is neither the duty nor the prerogative of 
the Supreme Court to explore a theory which 
is not raised in Appellants' Brief, to find 
a valid ground on which to reverse the trial 
court's judgment. 
Those grounds cited by Appellants' Brief as the basis 
for their appeal are insufficient to justify a reversal of the 
lower court's judgment. The presumptions and rules of law 
controlling the present case are wholly in support of Respondents' 
position that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
The affidavits, pleadings and exhibits on file herein, 
and the law as cited in Respondents' Brief, in Respondents' 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment and in 
Respondents1 Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment clearly establish that there are no disputed 
issues of material fact. The uncontroverted facts further 
establish that Appellants cannot recover a brokerage fee on any 
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of the alleged transactions. The lower court acted properly 
and correctly in granting Defendants' motion.for summary judgment* 
Respectfully submitted, 
JENSEN 
js for Defendants-Respondents 
ith 300 East, Suite 1 
"Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
I hereby certify that I mailed two copies of the 
foregoing Brief of Respondent to Robert J. DeBry, Attorney for 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 4835 Highland Drive, Suite 295-A, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84117, this Jl^/\Jj day of September, 1975, 
postage prepaid. 
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